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BOOK REVIEW
DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION-THE BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE WILLIAM
0. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES. By Bernard Wolfman, Jonathan
L. F. Silver and Marjorie A. Silver. Philadelphia: University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 1975. Pp. 204. $9.50.
Originally printed in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
Dissent Without Opinion is quite simply an examination of Justice
William 0. Douglas' voting and writing behavior in federal tax cases
throughout his career on the Supreme Court. But there ends the
simplicity. What follows is a scholarly analysis of Justice Douglas'
votes in 278 tax cases from 1939 to 1973. The book is a statistical
masterpiece.
Justice Douglas is known by lawyer and nonlawyer as a cham-
pion of individual liberties. Even his background in federal securi-
ties law has been the subject of a number of legal articles.1 But
in exploring Douglas' leadership in tax cases, Mr. Wolfman and his
associates strike out in a new direction.
Crisp organization impresses the reader from the beginning.
Part I develops in statistical detail the evolution of Justice Doug-
las' behavior in tax cases. These statistics form a convincing back-
drop to some interesting conclusions by the authors.
Tax cases follow an interpretive pattern, and to gain a deeper un-
derstanding of Douglas' voting pattern in the tax field, the authors de-
velop in Part II a comparison of Douglas' work in other areas of
the law requiring statutory interpretation such as corporate law, wel-
fare law, and labor law.
In Part III the authors leave the defenses of facts and figures
to speculate upon Douglas' dramatic change in approach regard-
ing the Internal Revenue Service.
The conclusion is described by author Wolfman as a reflection
"on Justice Douglas' performance in federal tax cases as a Justice
of the United States Supreme Court." '2 The difficulty in such a pro-
ject is evident not only from the natural complexity of federal tax
law, but the increasing influence of these same tax laws.
In examining Douglas' voting record, the authors found it possi-
1. The authors include a selected bibliography regarding Justice Douglas.
2. B. WOLFMAN, J. SILVER & M. SILVER, DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION-THE BEHAVIOR OF
JUsTIcE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES 4 (1975).
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ble to break his tenure into four separate periods. The discussion
of each period begins with an analysis of the statistical data relat-
ing to that particular period, which the authors have divided into
three tables.
"The first of these tables (Table I) shows the number of
tax cases won by the taxpayer in each period, and the num-
ber in which Justice Douglas voted for the taxpayer. Table
II exposes those cases, period by period, in which Justice
Douglas differed with the majority of the Court, and indi-
cates the extent to which Douglas was the sole dissenter.
Subtables divide the cases into two groups, one including
those which the taxpayer won, and the other, those in which
the Government won. Table III indicates the way in which
Justice Douglas expressed his dissenting views. The cases
are again divided by period, with notation of the number
of cases in which Douglas wrote an opinion, joined an opinion
and dissented without opinion. . . . These compilations lay
bare the fleshless pattern which lead us to dig below the
statistics in search of explanation." 3
Following this analysis is an in-depth discussion and examination
of selected cases from the particular period.
Helvering v. Clifford4 handed down in 1940, is the beginning,
the first tax case in which Justice Douglals participated and wrote.
The first period of analysis includes the years 1939, when Douglas
was appointed Associate Justice, through 1943. These were the "gov-
ernment years"-characterized by strong support for the govern-
ment's position, and exceptionally high number of majority opinions
authored by Douglas, and a high degree of quality in his writing.
In addition to some already discussed, a number of the cases
indicate that in this first period Justice Douglas devoted con-
siderable time and thought to the writing of tax opinions. The
point here is not that Douglas' conclusions were always
"right." It is only to emphasize that he supported his judg-
ments with reasoning and analysis which demanded attention
and were at least arguably correct.5
The unbalanced statistics during this period lead the authors to
some obvious conclusions. What might be surprising to Douglas ad-
mirers is that the Justice supported a broad view of the statutory
scheme in his early years on the Court which clearly aided the In-
ternal Revenue Service in enforcing tax laws. "His opinions reveal
3. Id. at 7-8.
4. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
5. B. WOLFMAN, J. SILVER & M. SILVER, DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION-THE BEHAVIOR OF
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES, 19 (1975).
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attention to legislative history and considerable concern for the prac-
tical necessities of administering the tax system."6
A shift to the taxpayer began in 1943 and was distinctly trace-
able to 1959. The statistics show Douglas began to differ from the
majority in a far greater number of cases. His vote in favor of the
taxpayer increased from 18 percent to 47 percent in the second
period. Many of his votes were recorded in dissents; in fact, the
Justice dissented in 29 of 87 cases in this period. Even the fact that he
dissented was in sharp contrast to his early period where he dis-
sented but once. He found himself in the minority over four times
as often as in the earlier period. Absent were the precise explana-
tions which characterized his earlier writings on the Court. Fifteen
of his dissents were without opinion.
Through their study of this period Wolfman and his co-authors
find Justice Douglas articulating a new philosophy-one against the
government. Their analysis of his opinions in which he expressed
this feeling shows he avoided opportunities for rational distinctions
within the legislative framework a distinctive feature of Period I.
Their analysis also showed other changes. During Period II, Doug-
las reduced the time he spent on tax cases. Lacking was the thorough-
ness of his earlier cases. Since many cases decided by the Court in
that period changed earlier opinions authored by Douglas, his failure
to enunciate his dissents left bewildering results. Throughout this
period, Douglas tended not to state reasons for his votes.
The next period encompasses the years 1959-1964, and evidences
a dramatic acceleration of the second period's trend. It is a sub-
stantially shorter period, and is distinguishable in the authors' opin-
ion by an extremeness in Douglas' voting pattern not seen in the
earlier years. The statistics in the last period, 1964-1973, "indicate
a blunting of the extreme tendencies which distinguish this third
period."
7
The vote for the taxpayer was 73 percent in Period III, as com-
pared to 47 percent in Period II, and 18 percent in Period I. Strik-
ingly, the majority held for the taxpayer in only 17 percent of the
cases in this period. Douglas differed with the majority in 54 per-
cent of the cases in this period. In every one of his dissents, he
voted for the taxpayer. (In the first period, his dissents favored the
government).
The statistics show the frequency of opinionless, and extremely
brief, dissents also grew significantly. In many instances, Douglas
become a lone dissenter. The Justice wrote no opinions for the Court
during this period and only two concurring opinions.
6. Id. at 26.
7. Id. at 43.
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The quality of his opinions also changed.
"The statistical data show that although Douglas was more
frequently in dissent during this period, he chose less fre-
quently to state the basis of his disagreement with the major-
ity. Additionally, as the cases already discussed have indi-
cated, when he did write, his positions were often unexplained
or poorly explained." 8
"This period was therefore an extreme one. Douglas was
more alienated from the Court than in any other period,
this by reference both to the percentage of cases in which
he dissented and to those in which he dissented alone. And
the positions he took were the least justified of any period." 9
Period IV is aptly entitled the "tempered rebellion," by the au-
thors and covers the years 1964-1973. It was a period of change for
the Court, the period of the Nixon appointments. Douglas reverses
and becomes less solitary and mute than he had been in the early
part of the decade. But his approach to the Code continued to favor
the taxpayer, and his hostility to the government heightened.
The authors conclude their statistical section of the book, which
they call the "record," with some generalizations. Among other
things, they declare their statistics irrefutably bear out that Doug-
las' "affinity for the taxpayer has its deepest roots in the areas of
the gift exclusion, depreciation, business expense deductions and
tax accounting. The taxpayers' positions in cases involving percent-
age depletion and capital gains have seemed less attractive to Doug-
las." 0
In attempting to explain their earlier conclusions, the authors
look to other areas of the law. They reason that a Justice's be-
havior in one area of the law is bound to affect his affiliation and
performance in others. Part II contrasts the areas of labor law, wel-
fare law and corporate insider regulation. These areas are examined
because, like the field of taxation, they involve the interpretation of
statutes. Therein lies more intense analytical comparison of cases
and statistics. The comparisons become so precise and detailed that
a thorough understanding of the substantive areas of law under dis-
cussion seems almost a necessity.
The book in its final chapter attempts to strike a "cord of ac-
countability." The conclusion is somewhat condemning. Justice Doug-
las is known for reflecting his individual beliefs in his opinions. It is
inevitable that he would contradict himself throughout a career
spanning thirty six years. The authors have pointed out that some of
the more startling contradictions have arisen in tax cases.
8. Id. at 54.
9. Id. at 59.
10. Id. at 77.
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"Although he is a person who appreciates the importance of
reasoned opinions, as a Justice he has been repeatedly un-
willing to write a reasoned basis for his judicial vote in tax
cases. Such a Justice does not enforce the cohesion nor can
he long attract the respect to the Court which he says he
values so highly."'
The ending is challenging.
"Taxation is too important, the Court's role too fundamental,
and Justice Douglas too capable for him to continue refusing
to judge in tax cases. We trust that in his remaining years
-on the Court this Justice, whose tenure exceeds all others'
and whose version of a free America in a system of law has
often provided hope and guidance, will judge tax cases as
he has stated judges should judge, and that he will reason
and will share his reasoning with us."'
12
Although the statistics seem to beg an explanation, there will
be none from Justice Douglas, at least through future opinions. With
the Justice's resignation the issue is left to speculation. One thing
appears certain, intellectual legal history such as Dissent Without
Opinion is sure to be welcomed by future Douglas biographers, but
the effort of these authors will not often be repeated.
JAMES S. HILL*
11. Id. at 137.
12. Id. at 138.
* J.D., 1974 University of North Dakota.
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